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a b s t r a c t 
The resilience of elements in a critical infrastructure system is a major factor determining 
the reliability of services and commodities provided by the critical infrastructure system to 
society. Resilience can be viewed as a quality which reduces the vulnerability of an element, 
absorbs the effects of disruptive events, enhances the element’s ability to respond and re- 
cover, and facilitates its adaptation to disruptive events similar to those encountered in the 
past. In this respect, resilience assessment plays an important role in ensuring the secu- 
rity and reliability of not only these elements alone, but also of the system as a whole. The 
paper introduces the CIERA methodology designed for Critical Infrastructure Elements Re- 
silience Assessment. The principle of this method is the statistical assessment of the level 
of resilience of critical infrastructure elements, involving a complex evaluation of their ro- 
bustness, their ability to recover functionality after the occurrence of a disruptive event and 
their capacity to adapt to previous disruptive events. The complex approach thus includes 
both the assessment of technical and organizational resilience, as well as the identification 
of weak points in order to strengthen resilience. An example of the application of the CIERA 
method is presented in the form of a case study focused on assessing the resilience of a 
selected element of electrical energy infrastructure. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
The functioning of a modern society is based on the exten-
sive use of infrastructure which ensures the basic function
of the state from the perspectives of both governance (state
and territorial) and the infrastructure providing goods and ser-
vices (supply, transport, electric power, communications, etc.).
Although the significance of these infrastructures has long
been known, they began to be researched in a more complex∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: david.rehak@vsb.cz (D. Rehak). 
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1874-5482/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an ope
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) way relatively recently. The term “critical infrastructure” (CI),
which these infrastructures have come to be identified with,
did not come into more extensive use until the publication of
the Critical Foundations study [1] . 
Each state determines which infrastructure elements (sec-
tors) are included from the complete list of infrastructure el-
ements (sectors) in its critical list. A comparison of critical
infrastructure sectors of the European Union Member States
was published, for example, in the ENISA study [2] . In indi-
vidual sectors and sub-sectors, the states then determine the
national critical infrastructure elements, whose operation is
governed by the relevant legislation – in the Czech Republic,
for example, the Crisis Management Act [3] . In this context,n access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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v
tritical infrastructure can be understood as a comprehensive 
ystem and individual sectors and sub-sectors as its subsys- 
ems, which are made up of individual elements. These ele- 
ents may be of a structural or equipment nature. 
It is imperative that these infrastructures maintain a high 
evel of reliability and security. Consequently, such system in- 
rastructures should be highly resilient to the effects of both 
nternal and external threats. Resilience in the context of crit- 
cal infrastructure was first defined in 2009 as “the ability to ab- 
orb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive 
vent“ [4] . However, in developing CI resilience, emphasis was 
ncreasingly placed on the adaptation of critical infrastructure 
o changing conditions over time [5] . 
In the intervening period, the system of critical infrastruc- 
ure underwent extensive research with respect to the assess- 
ent of its resilience. The first comprehensive study defin- 
ng the components of critical infrastructure resilience was 
he Resilience Measurement Index [6] . It classifies these com- 
onents in four basic groups: Preparedness, Mitigation Mea- 
ures, Response Capabilities and Recovery Mechanisms. How- 
ver, this classification is not complete in that it fails to ad- 
ress adaptability as the ability of a critical infrastructure sub- 
ystem to adapt to disruptive events similar to those it had 
ncountered in the past. 
The Measuring Critical Infrastructure Resilience study 
7] presents possible indicators of resilience but does not pro- 
ide any procedure for its evaluation. The first evaluation con- 
ept was introduced as part of the Guidelines for Critical In- 
rastructure Resilience Evaluation [8] . Evaluation in line with 
hese guidelines is framed in four dimensions: logical and 
hysical (technical), personal, organizational and cooperative.
In recent years, a number of studies have been published 
resenting various methodical approaches to evaluating crit- 
cal infrastructure resilience (e.g., [9–11] ). While these publi- 
ations brought numerous new findings as regards resilience 
uantification, their approach to the issue was mostly system- 
ased [12] . Evaluation thus focused primarily on the system or 
ector level of critical infrastructure [13] , altogether omitting 
he elementary level. In fact, this level of critical infrastructure 
hould not be ignored because it is at the level of elements that 
rotective measures, or measures aimed at strengthening re- 
ilience, are often implemented. A complex evaluation of in- 
rastructure elements can provide valuable feedback to help 
dentify weak points. Such information can then act as sup- 
ort in deciding the allocation of resources to initiate activi- 
ies for the purpose of strengthening resilience. For example,
abaka et al. [14] argues for the need to modify crisis man- 
gement as the tool for responding to unexpected events, as 
istinct from the Government of Canada [15] , which bases its 
ction plan on risk management. Both approaches, however,
mploy resilience as the means by which to achieve these ob- 
ectives. Therefore, management in its various forms can be 
aid to perform an integral role in ensuring the functions and 
rotection of critical infrastructure. 
The technical aspects of resilience have been studied, for 
xample, by Dueñas-Osorio et al. [16] , who examined the 
ragility of network infrastructure in terms of its ability to 
ithstand seismic activity. Several studies also focus on the 
nterdependence of elements in critical infrastructure net- 
orks and their fragility (e.g., [17–19] ). However, these ap- roaches focus on the critical infrastructure network as a 
hole. Such information is useful for strategic network man- 
gement but does not provide the information needed to im- 
lement safeguards at the element level. 
In the context of the above, was launched in 2015 the re- 
earch project of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Re- 
ublic, entitled “RESILIENCE 2015: Dynamic Resilience Evalua- 
ion of Interrelated Critical Infrastructure Subsystems”, which 
ocuses on the dynamic evaluation of critical infrastructure 
ectors, namely the electricity, transport and ICT sectors. One 
f the main goals of the project was to develop effective meth- 
ds for evaluating the resilience of individual elements of crit- 
cal infrastructure. 
Element resilience is the factor determining the re- 
ilience of higher critical infrastructure subsystems formed 
y these elements. This led the authors to develop the CIERA 
ethod (Critical Infrastructure Elements Resilience Assess- 
ent), which primarily focuses on equipment evaluation, as 
art of the above-mentioned project. The method and its 
omponents, procedures and methodologies are presented in 
ore detail below. Its basic premises have already been pub- 
ished recently in the paper entitled Resilience of Critical In- 
rastructure Elements and its Main Factors [20] . 
. Basic premises of resilience assessment in 
 critical infrastructure system 
he term resilience was first defined in 1973 by Holling [21] as 
he ability of a system to absorb or resist the effects of failures
nd other stress factors without any changes to the function- 
ng of the system. Although this wording was first applied to 
cological systems, over time the term resilience began to ap- 
ear in other scientific fields, including sociology, psychology 
nd economics. The relatively youngest field, with respect to 
ystem resilience research, is engineering. 
However, each of these fields views resilience somewhat 
ifferently. While ecology employs resilience as a tool to learn 
ore about the dynamics of an ecological system’s response 
o external or internal impulses that disrupt its functional- 
ty, in anthropogenic systems (such as critical infrastructure 
ystems or communities) resilience is regarded more as the 
esirable target status [20] . Society in general expects these 
ystems to be highly resilient. 
Whereas ecosystem resilience is, to a certain extent,
ormed autonomously, the resilience of anthropogenic sys- 
ems, as the desirable target status, must be developed and 
trengthened artificially. That is why the existing risk man- 
gement systems are not sufficient to strengthen resilience,
s they fail to cover the entire spectrum of resilience. Re- 
ilience essentially provides a much broader view of the is- 
ue of safety – it contains both processing and technical 
omponents. 
.1. Cycle of critical infrastructure resilience 
esilience is one of the key factors contributing to the preser- 
ation of the functionality of critical infrastructure subsys- 
ems, i.e. sectors, subsectors and elements [13] . It represents 
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Fig. 1 – Critical infrastructure resilience cycle [23] . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the ability of these subsystems to mitigate the intensity of
impacts caused by a disruptive event and to reduce the du-
ration of their failure or disruption [22] . From this perspec-
tive, resilience is a major factor determining the reliability
of critical infrastructure subsystems and may be understood
as a cyclic process based on the continual enhancement of
system prevention, absorption, recovery and adaptation [23] .
Fig. 1 shows one cycle within which resilience is strengthened
from its original level (i.e. the black dashed line) to a new one
(i.e. the red dashed line). The difference between these two
levels  is understood as the degree to which resilience has
been strengthened. 
The initial phase of the resilience cycle is prevention,
whereby subsystems are continually prepared for future dis-
ruptive events. Absorption, the second phase of the resilience
cycle, is determined by the robustness of critical infrastructure
subsystems and involves the ability of subsystems to absorb
the effects of these events without them causing fluctuations
in the provision of services. The recovery phase starts after
the effects of a disruptive event have worn off and is charac-
terized by recoverability, which is the capacity of a subsystem
to recover its function to the required level of performance.
The final phase of the resilience cycle is adaptation, which is
essentially the ability of an organization to adapt utilized sub-
systems to the potential recurrence of disruptive events. 
2.2. Framework for assessing the resilience of critical 
infrastructure elements 
The assessment of the resilience of critical infrastructure el-
ements is a specific and professionally demanding process.
Some basic principles, including the principles of complexity,
specificity, adequacy, impartiality and expertise, should there-
fore be applied in its implementation [24] . Moreover, the as-
sessment process should be based on clearly defined proce-
dures and quantitative supporting data. 
For the purposes of assessing CI resilience, the research
team focused primarily on the basic structural and perfor-
mance parameters of the element concerned, the existing
safety measures of the element being assessed, the organi-
zational processes supporting the strengthening of element
resilience and, last but not least, specific disruptive events
against which the element’s resilience is to be assessed (see
Fig. 2 ). The assessment involves elements which the organization
identified as of interest. The structural and performance pa-
rameters mainly represent the internal arrangement of these
elements within the critical infrastructure system as a whole.
From a structural point of view, they can have the character of
point elements, line elements or areal elements (i.e. a point el-
ement including two or more key technologies). Performance
parameters then refer especially to the quantity and perfor-
mance of key technologies. 
The current level of resilience is determined by the exist-
ing (already adopted) safety measures within the context of
assessments focused primarily on element robustness and re-
coverability. This requires current knowledge of the level of
crisis preparedness, redundancy, detection capability, respon-
siveness, physical resistance (i.e. technical means and orga-
nizational or system measures), as well as material, financial
and human resources or processes required for element re-
covery following a disruptive event. 
Organizational processes are another important source of
supporting data which helps form the resilience assessment
framework. Good knowledge thereof allows assessment of the
level of adaptability of the element to previous disruptive
events. The processes of risk management, innovation, edu-
cation and development are of particular interest in this con-
text. 
Since resilience assessment can only be carried out with
regard to specific disruptive event scenarios, it is essential
that we proceed based on threats which the element be-
ing assessed may be exposed to. The method includes eight
basic threat groups to facilitate the process of assessment
(see Table 1 ). In selecting individual groups, the team relied
on the PERIL disaster event classification used in databases
of large-scale event consequences [25] . From these events,
the team selected groups wherein threats primarily concern
infrastructure. 
For the purposes of assessment, the threats have been clas-
sified as internal and external. The further division into natur-
ogenic, technogenic and anthropogenic causes is based on the
general nature of each threat. However, the PERIL framework
[25] takes into account only technological threats. In order to
carry out the assessment of critical infrastructure resilience
it was necessary to differentiate between threats arising from
mere technological failures and those caused directly by hu-
mans (e.g. sabotage or terrorist attacks). The group of cascad-
ing effects was added to allow for the capturing of failure prop-
agation across the critical infrastructure system via cascading
effects [26] . 
The classification of threats given above is only general in
nature and the operators of critical infrastructure elements
can modify it to better reflect the character of threats to which
their particular elements are exposed. 
2.3. Components and variables determining the resilience 
of critical infrastructure elements 
The initial stage in preparing the CIERA method involved
a comparative analysis of the relevant papers published
to date. The results were used to propose the structural
components and some variables. This structure is primarily
based on the critical infrastructure resilience final report and
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Fig. 2 – Framework for assessing the resilience of critical infrastructure elements. 
Table 1 – Classification of threats for assessing the resilience of critical infrastructure elements. 
Naturogenic Technogenic Anthropogenic 
Internal threats – Process-technological threats Personnel threats 
External threats Geological threats Cascading threats Cyber threats 
Meteorological threats Physical threats 
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gecommendations document [4] ; however, it also partially re- 
ects two other important studies published in 2012 [27,28] .
he subsequent phase consisted of defining any potentially 
easurable items. The definition of these items was based on 
ublications addressing issues related to resilience measure- 
ent indicators [6–8] . 
Based on the available data, the authors of the method 
roceeded to formulate individual determining factors of re- 
ilience. This preparation stage hinged on the implementation 
f all variables determining all phases of resilience, i.e. pre- 
ention, absorption, recoverability and adaptability. The defi- 
ition of these determinants was limited by some factors that 
tem from the focus of the project. Therefore, the assessment 
omponents are primarily focused on individual critical in- 
rastructure elements, as opposed to the sector or subsector 
s a whole. The selection was also influenced by the planned 
tilization of the results as the basis for the long-term man- 
gement of element resilience. Accordingly, the assessment is 
rincipally focused on the issue of management. This stage resulted in the specification of 12 variables and 
67 measurable items being discussed with selected operators 
nd owners of critical infrastructure elements at the project 
orkshop held at the beginning of 2017. The variables and 
easurable items were subsequently classified into two ba- 
ic areas, namely (1) technological and physical protection of 
lements and (2) organization management. 
Resilience in the first area, referred to as technical re- 
ilience, is determined by the robustness and recoverability 
f infrastructure elements. The enhancement of technical re- 
ilience is invariably achieved exclusively in relation to a par- 
icular element or group of identical or very similar elements.
 good example is the electricity sector, where robustness and 
ecoverability will be secured in different ways and by differ- 
nt means depending on whether we are dealing with systems 
or the production of electricity or systems employed for its 
ransmission and distribution. 
The second area constituting element resilience is or- 
anization management. This type of resilience, known 
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Table 2 – Areas, components and variables determining the resilience of critical infrastructure elements. 
Areas Technical resilience Organizational resilience 
Components Robustness Recoverability Adaptability 
Variables Crisis preparedness Material resources Risk management 
Redundancy Financial resources Innovation processes 
Detection capability Human resources Education and development processes 
Responsiveness Recovery processes 
Physical resistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as organizational resilience, is determined by the level of
an organization’s selected internal processes focused on
the creation of optimum conditions for the adaptation of
critical infrastructure elements to disruptive events. Organi-
zational resilience is formed simultaneously for all critical
infrastructure elements operated by an organization. 
For variables determining the individual components of
the resilience of critical infrastructure elements see Table 2 . 
Robustness is the ability of an element to absorb the im-
pacts of a disruptive event. These impacts may be absorbed via
the structural qualities of buildings or the technologies used
(i.e. structural robustness) and/or via security measures (i.e.
security robustness). The level of robustness can only be as-
sessed relative to a particular disruptive event or, rather, the
intensity thereof. Where this level reaches 100%, the element
concerned becomes resistant to the impacts of the given dis-
ruptive event. This means that it is able to fully resist its ef-
fects without perceptible negative impacts on the element of
the service provided. 
Recoverability is the capacity of an element to recover its
function to the original (required) level of performance after
the effects of a disruptive event have ended. With respect to
critical infrastructure, recoverability is understood as repara-
bility, in which case only the damaged or destroyed compo-
nents of an element are repaired or replaced. Provided the re-
coverability (see the variables listed in Table 2 ) resources are
adequate, resilience can already be strengthened at this stage.
The implementation of more modern technologies, meeting
higher security standards and ensuring greater element ro-
bustness, can be used as an example. 
Adaptability is the ability of a critical infrastructure oper-
ator (i.e. an organization) to prepare an element for the po-
tential effects of disruptive events similar to those that oc-
curred in the past. Furthermore, it represents the dynamic
(long-term) ability of an organization to adapt to changes in
circumstances. 
In the context given above, individual components and
variables determining resilience can be said to affect the dy-
namics of the performance of the services provided by an el-
ement in response to a disruptive event (see Fig. 3 ). This dy-
namic can vary depending on the type of infrastructure and
the disruptive event and the manner of its management. 
As soon as an element begins to be affected by a disruptive
event, the absorption capacity of the element can be broken
down into two phases. In the first phase, the system is able
to absorb the impacts of a disruptive event without the need
to employ redundant capacities, up to the boundary of the el-
ement’s ability to absorb fully the impacts of the respectivedisruptive event (see point A in Fig. 3 ). In the second phase of
absorption, the redundant capacities available to the element
are employed and the element is still capable of delivering its
full performance as required. At this point, there is still an op-
portunity to detect adverse events and initiate a suitable re-
sponse [20] . 
Only after the redundant capacities of the element have
been exhausted, i.e. the limit of its ability to absorb the im-
pacts of a disruptive event has been reached (see point B in
Fig. 3 ), do the negative consequences of the event begin to
manifest in a decline of functions performed by the element.
The nature of this decline is determined by the capabilities of
the element to defend against the effects of the event. Where
such capabilities exist, the decline in performance of the ele-
ment may be gradual; however, if these capabilities are over-
come by the intensity of the disruptive event, the decline is
likely to be abrupt or even immediate [20] . 
3. Assessing the resilience of critical 
infrastructure elements 
The CIERA method was created to assess the resilience of
critical infrastructure elements. This method was developed
as part of the grant project of the Ministry of the Interior of
the Czech Republic entitled “RESILIENCE 2015: Dynamic Re-
silience Evaluation of Interrelated Critical Infrastructure Sub-
systems”. It was designed for the assessment of element re-
silience in technically oriented sectors such as energy, wa-
ter management, transport and communication/information
systems. However, the manner of assessment and some of
the metrics, when modified, can also be applied to other sec-
tors; for example, to evaluate the resilience of elements in the
emergency services or health sectors. 
As the proposed CIERA method focuses on assessing the
resilience of elements without the possibility of factoring in
the network characteristics of critical infrastructure, the fol-
lowing limiting conditions have been set for its application: 
– The assessment focuses on individual/specific elements
of critical infrastructure. The subject of the assessment is
the internal ability of critical infrastructure elements to
counter the effects of both internal and external disruptive
events. 
– The assessment must always be aimed at a particular dis-
ruptive event. 
– The created resilience model is static – the assessment
takes place in the phase of zero intensity with respect to
130 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 25 (2019) 125–138 
Fig. 3 – Graphical representation of components and variables determining the resilience of critical infrastructure elements 
[20] . 
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ithe disruptive event, i.e. at a point where the event is not 
affecting the critical infrastructure element. 
.1. Resilience assessment procedure 
he crucial phase of the CIERA method creation involved the 
stablishment of the resilience assessment procedure. This 
rocedure is based not only on general methods (e.g. [29] ), but 
t also incorporates features from specific methodologies (e.g.
9–11] ). 
The procedure for assessing the resilience of critical in- 
rastructure elements includes nine consecutive activities.
hese activities consist of selecting and describing the ele- 
ent being assessed, identifying and describing the threats 
gainst which the element is to be assessed, assessing the 
evel of individual components that determine the element’s 
esilience, calculating the element’s resilience, evaluating the 
eak points and proposing measures aimed at strengthening 
he element’s resilience. The sequence of individual activities 
s shown in Fig. 4 below. 
There are no restrictions as to the selection of an el- 
ment ( Activity 1 ). In developing the method, the research 
eam focused primarily on technical sectors. The method was 
ested on designated elements of the electricity (see Section 4 
erein), transport and health sectors. However, the team pre- 
umes the possibility of a wider application of the method’s 
rinciples. Subsequently the selected element is described ( Activity 2 ) 
s to its structural and performance parameters and catego- 
ized within the structure of the critical infrastructure. Ele- 
ent categorization is based on the sector, subsector or any 
ther structural specification (e.g. production, transmission 
r distribution with regard to the electricity sector) within 
hich it was first determined on the basis of sectoral crite- 
ia. Conversely, the performance parameters specify the ele- 
ent’s technological structure, which highlights the number 
nd capacity of key technologies. 
For the purposes of the assessment, it is necessary to iden- 
ify ( Activity 3 ), classify and describe all threats ( Activity 4 )
hich have the potential to initiate disruptive events lead- 
ng to a major decline or even interruption in the provision 
f services. The assessment should be conducted separately 
or each identified threat. Scenarios describing the progress 
f such events could be utilized as an appropriate supporting 
ool. In addition, these scenarios could also be viewed as a by- 
roduct of the proposed method; applicable, for example, to 
he dynamic modeling of resilience, reflecting the course of 
he disruptive event’s intensity; or to the modeling of cascad- 
ng and synergistic effects within a critical infrastructure sys- 
em (for example [13,30,31] ). Activities 1 and 2 must be done 
equentially. Similar approach should be done with activities 
 and 4. However, both sequences (i.e., 1, 2 and 3, 4) could be
olved at the same time. 
The assessment of robustness ( Activity 5 ) hinges on assess- 
ng the element’s ability to absorb the impacts of disruptive 
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Fig. 4 – Procedure for assessing the resilience of critical infrastructure elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 events. The level of all measurable items which determine a
variable must be assessed for each of the variables. The as-
sessment is based on a scale from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). For ex-
ample, the measurable item “Activation speed of substitution
linkages” is assessed on the following scale: 
5: Immediate activation (no reduction in performance). 
4: Delayed activation causing a short-term reduction in per-
formance of the assessed element. 
3: Delayed activation causing a short-term loss of perfor-
mance of the assessed element. 
2: Delayed activation causing a medium-term loss of per-
formance of the assessed element. 
1: Delayed activation causing a long-term loss of perfor-
mance of the assessed element. 
Element robustness is to be assessed with respect to a se-
lected particular threat. Based on this, one of the assessment
forms is used for the assessment. Assessments of recoverabil-
ity ( Activity 6 ) and adaptability ( Activity 7 ) are carried out sim-
ilarly. Each assessment activity has its own measurable items
with a specific assessment scale. 
The core activity of the procedure is the calculation of
the element’s resilience ( Activity 8 ). For the purposes of this
method, we have opted for a quantitative assessment model.
This model is based on the percentage expression of the de-
gree of fulfillment of individual components determining theelement’s resilience. This type of expression already includes
comparative values and can be readily used in other appli-
cations; for example, in the modeling of cascading and syn-
ergistic effects within a critical infrastructure system (see
[13,30,31] ). 
The resilience level of the critical infrastructure element is
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the component values
that determine it ( Formula (1) ): 
R = 1 
n 
n ∑ 
i =1 
K i (1)
where R = the resilience of the critical infrastructure element
[%]; K = the resilience components of the critical infrastruc-
ture element, i.e. robustness, recoverability and adaptabil-
ity [%]; n = the total number of components determining re-
silience. For a possible graphical representation of the critical
infrastructure element’s level of resilience, see Fig. 5 . 
The levels of individual components of the CI element’s re-
silience are determined by the weighted average of its vari-
ables ( Formula (2) ): 
K i = 
m ∑ 
j=1 
P j v j (2)
132 international journal of critical infrastructure protection 25 (2019) 125–138 
Fig. 5 – The resilience level of the critical infrastructure 
element. 
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Table 3 – Comparative table for assessing the resilience of 
the element and its components and variables. 
The resilience level of the element R , components K and variables P 
High level of resilience 85–100% 
Acceptable level of resilience 69–84% 
Low level of resilience 53–68% 
Unsatisfactory level of resilience 37–52% 
Critical level of resilience ≤36% 
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mhere K i = the i th component of the critical infrastructure el- 
ment’s resilience [%]; P j = the j th variable of the critical in- 
rastructure element’s resilience [%]; v j = the j th normalized 
eight of the j th variable of the critical infrastructure ele- 
ent’s resilience [ 〈 0; 1 〉 ]; m = the total number of variables in
he i th component. The normalized weights of the variable are 
resented in the following part of the paper. 
For a possible graphical representation of the level of the 
elected resilience component of the critical infrastructure el- 
ment and its variables, see Fig. 6 . 
The levels of the resilience variables of the critical infras- 
ructure element are determined by the weighted average of 
ndividual measurable items (Formula ( 3 )). Since the level of 
easurable items is expressed on a point scale in intervals of 
–5, it is necessary to multiply the expression in Formula ( 3 ) 
y 20, whereby the result is expressed in percentage points. 
 j = 20 
l ∑ 
k =1 
M P k w k (3) 
here P j = the j th variable of the critical infrastructure ele- 
ent’s resilience [%]; MP k = the k th measurable item of the 
ritical infrastructure element’s resilience [number of points]; 
 k = the k th normalized weight of the k th measurable item of 
he critical infrastructure element’s resilience at interval 〈 0; 1 〉 ; 
 = the total number of measurable items in the j th variable. 
Calculation of formulas ( 1 )–( 3 ) uses linear aggregation of 
eighted values. This method of calculation may be subject 
o a number of problems. Particularly significant is the im- 
licit possibility of substitution, i.e., the possibility of offset- 
ing a lower value of one variable by a higher value of the sec- 
nd variable. This presents a problem, especially if the result 
hould be compared, for example, to different elements. How- 
ver, the current version of the methodology does not allow 
or this use. The endeavor to “game” the system is techni- 
ally possible but makes practically no sense, because nothing 
ompels the operator to use this particular system of evalua- 
ion. 
The advantage of linear aggregation is the ease of under- 
tanding and relative simplicity of interpreting the results,
hich were the main reasons for choosing this method of cal- 
ulation by the authoring team of the methodology. However,f in the future, the problem of comparability across elements 
ere solved, then formulas ( 1 )–( 3 ) would need to be revised
sing non-compensatory methods (e.g., [32,33] ). 
In view of the above-mentioned relationships (Formulas 
 1 )–( 3 )), the aggregate formula for calculating the level of the
ritical infrastructure element’s resilience can be defined as 
ollows ( Formula (4) ): 
 = 1 
n 
n ∑ 
i =1 
m ∑ 
j=1 
20 v j 
l ∑ 
k =1 
M P k w k (4) 
The values of individual variables and components are cal- 
ulated using the assessment forms of robustness, recover- 
bility and adaptability. The resulting level of the element’s 
esilience is determined and the final assessment completed 
n the last assessment form. 
The final activity of the procedure to assess the critical 
nfrastructure element’s resilience consists of assessing the 
esilience level, identifying any weak points and proposing 
easures to strengthen the element’s resilience ( Activity 9 ).
he level of resilience may be assessed at the level of the el-
ment (i.e. complex assessment), the component (i.e. partial 
ssessment) or the variable (i.e. elementary assessment). A 
omparative table is used to assess the level of resilience (see 
able 3 ). 
The division of the resilience acceptability levels in 
able 3 is based on the failure mode, effects and criticality 
nalysis [34] method, which uses multiple variables to deter- 
ine the risk level, and is based on variations in their extreme 
alues. Similarly, individual resilience levels have been deter- 
ined, which take into account variations in extreme values 
i.e., 1 and 5) for five variables: 
– Critical level: 1,1,1,1,5 = > ∅ 1.8 = > 36% 
– Insufficient level: 1,1,1,5,5 = > ∅ 2.6 = > 52% 
– Low level: 1,1,5,5,5 = > ∅ 3.4 = > 68% 
– Acceptable level: 1,5,5,5,5 = > ∅ 4.2 = > 84% 
– High level: 5,5,5,5,5 = > ∅ 5.0 = > 100% 
The division of resilience acceptability into five grades of 
ssessment is guided by an effort to motivate users to explore 
n more detail the composition of resilience, i.e., the retrospec- 
ive decomposition of component resilience and variable rat- 
ngs. In view of the fact that the methodology is not intended 
o serve for mutual comparison across elements, the authors 
onsider the requirement for a weak consistency of assess- 
ent [35] to be sufficient. 
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Fig. 6 – The robustness level of the critical infrastructure element. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Normalized weights of variables determining 
the robustness of critical infrastructure elements based 
on the element’s topology. 
Variables Point 
element 
weights 
Areal 
element 
weights 
Line 
element 
weights 
Crisis preparedness 0.15 0.15 0.25 
Redundancy 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Detection capability 0.25 0.25 0.20 
Responsiveness 0.20 0.25 0.15 
Physical resistance 0.25 0.15 0.15 
 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The level of resilience R indicates the overall condition of
the element (i.e. its ability to absorb the impacts of disruptive
events and to recover its function to the original/required level
of performance after the effects of a disruptive event have
ended) and the condition of the organization (i.e. the ability
of a critical infrastructure operator to prepare an element for
the recurring effects of a previous disruptive event). The level
of resilience K indicates the condition of individual compo-
nents, while the level of resilience P indicates the condition of
individual variables. 
Where the resilience level reaches ≤ 68%, it will be neces-
sary to identify the weak points through the decomposition of
the resilience assessment results, which is to be done at the
level of the affected measurable items. In cases where mea-
surable items show a resilience point value of 3 and less, the
affected areas of the assessed element will need to be revised
and the process of their adjustment and recovery initiated. 
The decomposition of the resilience assessment results
will make it possible to propose measures aimed at strength-
ening the element’s resilience. Resilience must always be
strengthened at the lowest level, i.e. at the level of measurable
items, as follows: 
– High level of resilience (5): as the measurable items in this
category show excellent parameters, there is no need to
adopt any further measures. 
– High level of resilience (4): the measurable items in this
category show very good parameters which can still be im-
proved upon, but such improvements are not necessary for
the overall level of the element’s resilience. 
– Low level of resilience (3): the measurable items in this cat-
egory show sufficient parameters, although their improve-
ment would lead to substantial strengthening of the ele-
ment’s resilience. 
– Unsatisfactory level of resilience (2): the measurable items
in this category show very poor parameters which greatly
reduce the resilience of the variable to which they belong. – Critical level of resilience (1): the measurable items in this
category are either absent or show critically low parame-
ters. It is imperative that these items are fully revised and
the process of their adjustment and restoration is initiated
as soon as possible. 
3.2. Establishing the weights of variables and 
measurable items 
The v j a w k weights constitute an important part of the as-
sessment (see Formulas ( 2 ) and ( 3 )), as the weight values allow
differentiation of the significance of individual components
of the assessment. Following consultations held with the in-
tended users of the method, the research team arrived at the
conclusion that the weights should be derived separately for
different types of critical infrastructure elements. See Table 4
for an example of normalized weights of variables determin-
ing the element’s robustness. 
The values were estimated based on the expert evalu-
ation of assumed future users and by applying the paired
comparison method. The values of the derived weights were
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Table 5 – Description of the electricity critical infrastruc- 
ture element being assessed. 
Name of element Control room of the distribution 
system operator 
Sector/subsector: Energy/electricity/distribution system 
Topological 
structure: 
Areal element: 
Key technologies: 1. SCADA systems 
(a) Control system for operating the 
distribution system elements 
(b) Communication control system 
(c) Command system 
2. Geographic information system 
Number of 
distribution 
nodes: 
740,000 
Table 6 – Description of the threat against which the ele- 
ment was assessed. 
Name of threat: Cyber attack 
Category of threat Anthropogenic 
Group of threats: Cyber 
Specification of threat: SCADA system disruption 
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normalized so that their sum in the variable ( w k ) and in the
omponent ( v j ) equalled 1 (Formula ( 5 )). 
m 
 
j=1 
v j = 
l ∑ 
k =1 
w k = 1 (5) 
By its very nature, the expert evaluation and scales derived 
rom it will always be subjective to a certain extent. Given that 
ntense research is still ongoing in this area, there is no widely 
ccepted hierarchy of items, and so the assessment must be 
omewhat subjective. The use of such approaches in manage- 
ent is not unusual [36] . Specifications of weighting coeffi- 
ients allow this subjectivity to be transparently collected in 
ne place and admitted. If necessary, the weighting system 
an be revised in the future. 
Table 7 – Identification of weak points in the resilience of the as
Measurable items with an unsatisfactory level of re
Robustness 1.1.1 CSIRT/Organization’s security team 
Recoverability –
Adaptability 3.1.1 Risk management level 
3.1.4 Disruptive scenario specification 
3.2.4 Management processes innovation . CIERA method case study 
he initial verification of the method was done by analyzing 
he results of the realized case studies that were processed 
or the sectors of electricity (control room of the distribution 
ystem operator), transport (a railway station on an interna- 
ional track) and public health (a university hospital). The re- 
ults were subsequently discussed with the operators of the 
lements being assessed and applied to adjusting the method 
urther. The anonymous results of one of the assessments are 
resented below with a view to facilitating the interpretation 
f the use of the CIERA method. 
For the purposes of the assessment, the control room of an 
ndisclosed power distribution company was selected ( Activ- 
ty 1 ). This company operates in three regions, where it dis- 
ributes electricity to nearly 740,000 customers (businesses 
nd households). 
Subsequently, the selected element was described ( Activity 
 ) as to its structural and performance parameters and cat- 
gorized within the structure of critical infrastructure. The 
lement’s structural parameters specify its topological struc- 
ure and, in the case of areal elements, key technologies. The 
lement’s performance parameter with regard to the control 
oom is the number of distribution nodes. These data are pre- 
ented in Table 5 . 
The assessment of the resilience of this particular element 
as carried out with respect to seven selected threats ( Activity 
 ). However, due to its extent, this subchapter includes only 
he assessment results concerning the element’s resilience in 
onnection with cyber-attacks. See Table 6 for a description of 
his threat ( Activity 4 ). 
The following part of the case study presents the assess- 
ent results with respect to the element’s robustness, recov- 
rability and adaptability. The first step was to assess the ro- 
ustness of the element ( Activity 5 ), which consisted of assess- 
ng the current condition (level) of its individual variables, i.e.
he element’s crisis preparedness, redundancy, detection ca- 
ability, responsiveness and physical resistance. For the as- 
essment results, see Fig. 7 . 
The next step was to assess the recoverability of the ele- 
ent ( Activity 6 ), which consisted of assessing the current con- 
ition (level) of individual variables, i.e. material resources, fi- 
ancial resources, human resources and recovery processes.
or the assessment results, see Fig. 8 . 
The element’s adaptability was the last resilience compo- 
ent to be assessed ( Activity 7 ). The assessment of the ele- sessed element. 
silience Measurable items with a critical level of resilience 
1.3.4 Incident reporting 
–
3.1.2 Risk assessment methodology 
3.1.3 Safety standard implementation 
3.2.1 Organizational structure 
3.2.3 Management of organizational processes 
3.2.7 Research and development 
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Fig. 7 – Assessment of the element’s robustness with respect to cyber-attacks. 
Legend: P = point element, A = areal element, L = line element. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ment’s adaptability consisted of assessing the current condi-
tion (level) of individual variables, i.e. risk management and
innovation, education and development processes. For the as-
sessment results, see Fig. 9 . 
The core activity of the assessment was the calculation
of the element’s resilience ( Activity 8 ). The resilience level of
the critical infrastructure element was calculated as the arith-
metic mean of the component values that determine it (see
Formula ( 1 )). For the assessment results, see Fig. 10 . 
The final activity of the procedure to assess the critical
infrastructure element’s resilience consisted of assessing the
resilience level, identifying any weak points and proposing
measures to strengthen the element’s resilience ( Activity
9 ). The level of resilience was assessed gradually based on
comparative values (see Table 3 ) at three levels. 
The lowest level at which resilience is assessed is the el-
ement level. In this regard, the element’s resilience to cyber-
attacks can be said to be 76.8%, which is considered an accept-
able level of resilience. 
This was followed by resilience assessment at the compo-
nent level. The resilience of the element’s robustness and re-
coverability is 83.5% and 88.3% respectively, which can be re-
garded as a high or near-high level of resilience. However, in
terms of the element’s adaptability, the value is 58.6%, which
is a low, nearly unsatisfactory level. Since some variables of
this component show very poor parameters, substantially re-ducing the element’s resilience, it is essential that the relevant
areas of the assessed element be revised. 
The final level is the level of variables. In this case, the re-
silience of most of the variables is 69% or more, which is con-
sidered to be an acceptable level or resilience. Crisis Prepared-
ness (60%) and Innovation Processes (60%) can be regarded as
the weakest variables, while Risk Management is at a critical
level of resilience with a mere 34% (see Table 3 ). It is impor-
tant that the weak points in the element’s resilience are sub-
sequently identified with respect to these variables. This task
involves identifying the measurable items that are at unsatis-
factory or critical levels in the assessment (see Table 7 ). 
Following the identification of weak points, it will be nec-
essary to formulate a proposal for measures designed to
strengthen the element’s resilience. With respect to measur-
able items at an unsatisfactory level of resilience (point score
2), we recommend focusing especially on risk management,
where the scenarios of individual disruptive events need to
be elaborated further. Conversely, measurable items assessed
to be at a critically low level of resilience (point score 1) are ei-
ther entirely missing or show critically low parameters. This
concerns particularly the area of incident reporting and ac-
tivities related to the element’s organizational resilience. It
is imperative that these items are fully revised and the pro-
cess of their adjustment and restoration is initiated as soon as
possible. 
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Fig. 8 – Assessment of the element’s recoverability with respect to cyber-attacks. 
Legend: P = point element, A = areal element, L = line element. 
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c. Conclusion 
he CIERA quantitative method presented in this paper has 
een designed for Critical Infrastructure Elements Resilience 
ssessment. The method primarily relies on the complex as- 
essment of the robustness, recoverability and adaptability of 
lements in technically oriented sectors with respect to dis- 
uptive events of naturogenic, technogenic and anthropogenic 
rigin. It takes into account the functional, structural and per- 
ormance parameters of the elements being assessed, while 
acilitating the identification of the element’s weak points.
hen incorporated into the risk management system, this 
ype of information will prove useful in proposing appropri- 
te measures aimed at strengthening the element’s resilience.
he benefit of this method is that it allows for the assessment 
o be carried out at the level of the particular elements, for 
lement resilience is the factor determining the resilience of 
igher critical infrastructure subsystems formed by these el- 
ments. 
The CIERA method has been designed to assess separate 
lements in a critical infrastructure system. In terms of as- 
essing critical infrastructure as a whole, it constitutes the 
rst step in assessing the resilience of individual subsystems,ith due consideration given to the determined limiting con- 
itions. This step can therefore be followed by a comparative 
valuation (or ranking) of elements within the operator’s in- 
rastructure. While the method can aid this step in the process 
y providing some useful data, it will not solve it by itself. For
irect comparison, it will be necessary to resolve the issue of 
vercoming the differences between the various types of el- 
ments in the operated infrastructures (i.e. point, areal, line 
nfrastructures), or to aggregate the assessments into directly 
omparable units. 
The case study presented in the final part of the paper pro- 
ides an example of the practical application of the CIERA 
ethod. The critical infrastructure element being assessed is 
he control room of an undisclosed power distribution com- 
any. As the assessment results show, the weakest area is the 
lement’s organizational resilience, especially with regard to 
ts static organizational structure, insufficient management 
f organizational processes and very low investment in re- 
earch and development of protection mechanisms against 
yber-attacks. Concerning the element’s technical resilience,
he assessment revealed the absence of an incident reporting 
rocess, an inadequate risk management policy and insuffi- 
ient specification of disruptive event scenarios. 
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Fig. 9 – Assessment of the element’s adaptability with respect to cyber-attacks. 
Fig. 10 – The resilience level of the assessed element. 
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